Introduction
There is an extensive literature that studies the characteristics of e¢ cient allocations of consumption and work e¤ort in an economy with moral hazard (see [13] , [3] , [9] and [7] ). The standard assumption in this literature is that e¤ort a¤ects only current output. It is widely accepted that this constitutes a strong simplifying assumption in many of the settings to which the repeated moral hazard model is applied. In unemployment insurance design, for example, the unemployed agent can exert some unobservable e¤ort to increase his probability of getting a job. When the agent interviews with several recruiting …rms or makes some networking e¤orts, however, he improves his chances of getting a job not only at the time when he is taking those actions but also in the following weeks. The same kind of persistent e¤ect of actions applies in health insurance, where the e¤ect of eating or exercising habits in early years may in ‡uence the probability of a client needing health care as he gets older. Other examples may be the design of optimal lending of working capital to …rms, the design of compensation schemes for CEO's, or the study of life-time earning pro…les of workers who build human capital as they work.
Introducing persistence of e¤ort is not a straightforward generalization since the methods used for the standard case do not easily extend to this setup. Without persistence, outcome realizations are independent of previous actions, making incentives to deviate in a given period depend only on the continuation contract. Although the contract depends on past history, all the relevant information can be summarized in one variable, the continuation utility promised to the agent in each period. This feature makes it possible to write the repeated moral hazard in a recursive way (see [12] ), simplifying the analysis and computation of the optimal contract.
Persistence means that, for a given continuation contract, incentives for deviation at a certain period may depend on the actual sequence of e¤orts chosen by the agent up to that point. In consequence, we need to check for the possibility of joint deviations involving e¤ort choices in more than one period; this complicates the computation of the optimal contract.
In this paper we show that whenever the utility of the agent is linear in e¤ort and output depends on a linear combination of past e¤orts, persistence is not a major complication. With a simple rearrangement of the terms in the expression for the lifetime utility of the agent, we show that the optimal sequence of consumption and e¤ort recommendations can be easily recovered from the solution of a related standard repeated moral hazard problem. The sequence of contingent consumptions is a solution for both the auxiliary and the original problem, making them observationally equivalent. The intuition behind this result comes from the fact that our linearity assumptions make both the marginal bene…t and the marginal cost of e¤ort history independent, as in a standard problem without persistence. Only the properties of e¤ort recommendations change with the presence of persistence. Under our assumptions, the optimal sequences of consumption in problems with persistence have the same properties as the ones in problems without persistence, and the results found so far in the literature apply also to the more realistic setup studied here.
So far there is no clear understanding of how the characteristics of the optimal consumption path change with the presence of persistence in a more general framework. Fernandes and Phelan [4] provide the …rst recursive treatment of agency problems with e¤ort persistence. In their paper, the current e¤ort of the agent a¤ects output in the same period and in the following one. Their setup is characterized by three parameters: the number of periods that the e¤ect of e¤ort lasts for, the number of possible e¤ort levels and the number of possible outcome realizations. All three parameters are set to two and this makes their formulation and their computational approach feasible. The curse of dimensionality applies whenever any of the three parameters is increased. Moreover, no results are given in their paper on how the properties of the optimal contract di¤er from the case without persistence.
Mukoyama and Sahin [6] show in a two period contract with two possible levels of e¤ort that if persistence is high it may be optimal for the principal to perfectly insure the agent in the …rst period. Our results imply that their result will not hold in general when allowing for a continuum of e¤ort choices.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the main result. Since in our setup the utility of the agent is linear in e¤ort, we must impose a lower bound on e¤ort (to assure that the class of problems we are looking at is not empty or has a trivial solution). 1 The result in Section 2 does not assume directly a lower bound on current e¤ort but instead we impose a nonnegativity constraint on a depreciated sum of past e¤orts. In Section 3 we discuss conditions under which a nonnegativity constraint can be assumed directly on current e¤ort -as it is customary in the repeated moral hazard literature. Section 4 concludes.
Consider a problem of repeated moral hazard (RMH) where the e¤ort carried out by the agent each period a¤ects current and future output distributions. Let there be a …nite set of possible outcomes each period, with minimum y and maximum y: Let Y t ; with typical element y t = (y 0; y 1 ; :::; y t ) ; denote the set of histories of outcome realizations up to time t: The history of outcomes is assumed to be common knowledge. To capture the persistence of e¤ort, we assume that current output is a function of all past e¤orts. E¤ort builds up the input that the …rm needs in order to produce, which we will refer to as human capital. We denote this human capital by s t and de…ne it as the depreciated sum of past e¤orts:
were 2 (0; 1) measures the persistence of e¤ort on the future distributions of outcomes.
The limit case of = 0 corresponds to the standard RMH problem in which the probability distribution of outcomes depends only on current e¤ort. The distribution of outcomes at time t is denoted by (y t js t ) : We impose that s t can only take positive values, and we assume full support for all s t 0: 2 Note that the nonnegativity of s t gives a lower bound on e¤ort, e t s t 1 , i.e., there is a limit to the amount of accumulated human capital that can be 2 We thank an anonimous referee for pointing out the lack of bound to negative e¤ort deviations in an earlier version of the paper.
"consumed" through negative e¤ort. 3 We assume the agent has additive separable utility that is linear in e¤ort:
where c t is consumption, with c t 2 [0; c] 8t; and u is strictly concave with u (0) = 1 and u 0 (0) = 1 (negative e¤ort is interpreted as a human capital destroying activity from which the agent derives utility.)
A contract is a tuple
where s t :
. 4 Note that s 1 (y 0 ) = s 1 , since there is no history in the …rst period. The principal decides the contingent transfer scheme that will provide the necessary incentives for the agent to implement the desired level of s at each point in time and for each possible history of outcomes.
The timing is as follows: in the …rst period, the agent accepts or rejects the contract o¤ered by the principal. If he accepts, both parties commit to the contract. At the beginning of any period t the agent chooses the amount of e¤ort he wants to exert. Output y t is realized according to the distribution determined by the e¤ort choices up to time t, and the corresponding amount 3 This assumption may seem restrictive, as it puts a bound on current e¤ort which depends on past e¤orts.
Conditions under which the more natural constraint e t 0 is su¢ cient are studied in Section 3. 4 We are abusing notation by denoting by s t both the actual level of acumulated e¤ort and the strategy of the agent that the pricipal wants to implement. Note that when we refer to the strategy the dependence on the history of outcomes is made explicit.
of consumption c t (y t ) is given to the agent.
For any vector y t = (y 1 ; y 2 ; : : : ; y t ) and e¤ort strategies s t = (s 1 ; s 2 (y 1 ) ; : : : ; s t (y t 1 )) ; let (y t js t (y t 1 )) = Q t =1 (y i js (y 1 )) denote the probability of history y t given these e¤ort strategies. The principal is risk neutral and designs the contract C in order to maximize the expected discounted cash ‡ow given by the di¤erence between the output and the promised contingent payments:
:
As usual, the principal faces participation and incentive constraints. Let EU (C) denote the expected utility of the agent from following the recommendations of a given contract C: Since s t is a linear combination of past e¤orts we can also write the expected utility of the agent in terms of this variable. 5 Given that e t = s t (1 ) s t 1 ;
The Participation Constraint (PC) makes sure the initial expected utility of the agent in the contract is at least as large as his outside utility U :
The Incentive Constraint (IC) makes sure that the agent does not have a pro…table deviation,
i.e. the sequence of e¤ort levels implied by the recommended plan fs t (y t 1 )g 1 t=1 must be a 5 Without loss of generality, it is assumed that s 0 = 0:
solution to the maximization problem faced by the agent, given the contingent consumption transfers established by the contract C; namely,
Unlike in a standard RMH problem, there is no recursive representation making the IC a perperiod constraint on the level of e¤ort. Persistence means that, for a given continuation contract, incentives for deviation at a certain period may depend on the actual sequence of e¤orts chosen by the agent up to that point. In consequence, we need to check for the possibility of joint deviations involving e¤ort choices in more than one period; this complicates the computation of the optimal contract.
However, as we now show, the problem with persistence can be translated into a standard RMH, where the usual recursive tools can be used to derive the optimal contract. 6 The result presented here is valid whenever the utility of the agent is linear in e¤ort, and the dependence of s t on the history of e¤orts is linear (in particular, the value of the depreciation factor could be changing over time and the result would still hold). Linearity in the human capital accumulation combined with linearity in the disutility function assures that both the marginal 6 Even without the assumption of linear disutility of e¤ort there exists a recursive formulation of the problem.
However, the characterization of the problem becomes complicated due to the fact that the value function of the principal depends on three state variables. Carrying extra state variables makes the preferences of the agent over continuation contracts known on the equilibrium path. This is done in the same spirit as in the recent papers analyzing moral hazard problems with unobserved savings (see [1] and [14] .) cost of e¤ort and the marginal bene…t of e¤ort are independent of future or past choices of e¤ort.
Given the linearity of human capital on e¤ort, a rearrangement of terms in the expression for the expected utility comes very naturally, simplifying the problem enormously. The terms in which an s with the same time index enters the expression above can be collected into one:
Now both the objective function of the principal and the constraints are written in terms of s:
By simple inspection of the above problem it becomes apparent that the solution for the optimal sequence of s t is also a solution for the optimal e¤ort in a RMH problem without persistence in which the marginal disutility of e¤ort is (1 ). This related moral hazard problem can be thought of as an auxiliary problem to ours, since it can be easily solved using standard recursive methods and used to learn about the properties of the solution to the problem with persistence. 7 Denote the solution for e¤ort in the auxiliary problem as fẽ t g 1 t=1 :
The sequence of optimal contingent recommendations for s in the problem with persistence will be the same as the recommendations forẽ in the related RMH, and the sequence of contingent consumption will be exactly the same in both problems. Using the de…nition of s we can recover the corresponding sequence of e¤ort levels for the problem with persistence:
. .
Note that, as in any RMH problem with linear disutility of e¤ort, absent a lower bound on e¤ort the solution to the auxiliary problem would be of no interest. The problem may have either a trivial solution, in which the agent always deviates and chooses a very negative level of e; or no solution, if we were considering a social planner's problem in which negative e¤ort is the most e¢ cient way of providing the agent with utility. The standard approach in the literature is to impose a non negativity constraint on per period e¤ort:ẽ t 0 for all t: 8 The corresponding 7 See [10] for a seminal contribution to the study of the properties of consumption dynamics in the optimal contract, and [12] for the introduction of the recursive formulation. 8 For some examples of articles that assume linear disutility of e¤ort, see [2] , [5] , [8] , or [11] . restriction in our original problem with persistence is s t 0 for all t. This restriction guarantees that the conclusions from our analysis do not apply only to a vacuous class of problems, and preserves our equivalence result. From the set of equations in (1) we see that large drops in the value of s from one period to the next could imply negative e¤ort levels. However, it is easy to construct examples where e¤ort stays in positive values: take a RMH problem for which the sequenceẽ t is bounded above and bounded away from zero. For su¢ ciently low persistence ( small enough), e¤ort requirements in the problem with persistence will be positive. Note that this is not equivalent to imposing a nonnegativity constraint directly on e¤ort, since this reduces the set of deviations available to the agent (recall that in our equivalence the weaker condition e t s t 1 is used). In order for our equivalence result to go through under the nonnegativity constraint on e¤ort it must be the case that the removed deviations do not bind.
Su¢ cient conditions are examined in the next section.
An important implication of the relationship we established between the problem with persistence and the auxiliary one is that the sequence of contingent consumption will be exactly the same in both problems. This makes the two problems observationally equivalent. The results found in the moral hazard literature on the long run distribution of utilities and the individual consumption paths will also hold in our environment with persistence and linear disutility. 9 The more general case of convex disutility of e¤ort would di¤er from the one studied here 9 See [12] , [9] , [7] , and [3] .
mainly because the marginal disutility of e¤ort that the agent equates throughout the periods varies when considering a deviation. It may be conjectured that the closer the disutility is to linear, the more the contract will resemble the one described here.
Positive E¤ort Levels
The result derived in the previous section required imposing a lower bound on the values that human capital can take. It may seem more natural to impose the domain restrictions on the e¤ort level directly, as it is usually done in the moral hazard literature. In this section we provide conditions that allow us to put an exogenous bound on e¤ort and still be able to use the related moral hazard problem to recover the solution to our problem.
We start by specifying conditions that assure that the optimal sequence of e¤ort in the problem with persistence, {e t g; is always positive. Assume the following Inada condition:
where E[ ] denotes the expectation with respect to the conditional distribution of output determined by s: This implies that the solution forẽ t in the auxiliary problem is interior. It is also easy to see that {ẽ t g is also bounded above, as c 2 [c; c]. This carries on to the solution for s in the problem with persistence. Let s> 0 and s denote these bounds. From (1), we have e t s s:
For su¢ ciently low this implies e t 0 for all t:
Having an exogenous lower bound on e¤ort means changing the constraint from imposing positive human capital,
to imposing positive e¤ort,
Under (3), the set of available e¤orts is a subset of that under (2) . Since the optimal sequence for the principal never violates the nonnegativity constraint on e¤ort, the smaller domain does not make the principal worse o¤. However, it may rule out some pro…table deviations for the agent, thus changing the IC. Decreasing the set of deviations may break the equivalence between the problem with persistence and the auxiliary one: the principal may be able to do better with this restricted set of deviations, and thus the solution to the problem with persistence would be di¤erent from that of the auxiliary problem.
For our equivalence result to go through, we need to provide conditions that assure that the deviations we are ruling out by imposing e t 0 are less pro…table for the agent than the ones that are still available. In other words, the utility the agent may get from choosing negative e¤ort has to be smaller than the highest utility he may get by choosing any positive e¤ort level. A su¢ cient condition for this property is that the problem of the agent be concave in e¤ort. This is an implicit assumption in all the literature that uses the First Order Approach, where the incentive constraint of the agent is substituted by …rst order conditions. Although it has proven very di¢ cult to provide assumptions on the primitives that assure concavity in the dynamic problem of the agent, there are restricted setups where it holds trivially. As an example, consider a problem in which there are only two possible outcomes each period, y H and y L : If the probability of the high outcome, (y H js) ; is concave in s; the problem of the agent is concave in e¤ort.
Conclusion
The moral hazard literature has pointed out repeatedly the importance of generalizing the current models of asymmetric information to setups in which either the hidden endowment of the agent or the e¤ect of the agent's e¤ort are correlated in time. In this note we …nd a particular model of temporal persistence of the agent's e¤ort that allows us to very simply characterize the optimal contract. Under the assumption of linear disutility of e¤ort, we show that when output depends on a distributed lag of past e¤orts the optimal contingent consumption is identical to the one obtained in a related moral hazard problem without persistence. We conclude that persistence does not necessarily change the properties of the optimal contract.
